The Chinese government has recently introduced a policy requiring all large Chinese business corporations to transform their corporate cultures with the aim of increasing their competitiveness on the international stage. This paper traces the origins of the policy to the outstanding performance of a small number of Chinese firms since the late 1980s, a phenomenon attributed by the CEOs of these firms to effective implementation of cultural values change among their workforces. We give detailed accounts of two such firms, Haier Group and Huawei Technologies, demonstrating how they have utilized cultural management techniques to improve their employees' performance. We also identify some negative aspects of their approach to cultural management that may impede these firms in their efforts to become truly international corporations. 
Abstract:
The Chinese government has recently introduced a policy requiring all large Chinese business corporations to transform their corporate cultures with the aim of increasing their competitiveness on the international stage. This paper traces the origins of the policy to the outstanding performance of a small number of Chinese firms since the late 1980s, a phenomenon attributed by the CEOs of these firms to effective implementation of cultural values change among their workforces. We give detailed accounts of two such firms, Haier Group and Huawei Technologies, demonstrating how they have utilized cultural management techniques to improve their employees' performance. We also identify some negative aspects of their approach to cultural management that may impede these firms in their efforts to become truly international corporations. Likewise, over the past decade, the vast majority of China's largest corporations and conglomerates have set up corporate culture programs. A survey of the top three hundred Chinese corporations or corporate groups by asset size reveals that almost 90% of them include references to corporate culture programs on their websites, as do 79% of the top two hundred privately-managed corporations (minying qiye).
1 It is striking to find this broad consensus among so many state-and privately-controlled corporations covering the 1 Survey of corporate websites carried out by one of the authors in 2007, and updated in 2009. full gamut of industrial sectors from steel-making, chemicals, and automobile production to real estate development, financial services, and food retailers.
Clearly the corporate culture phenomenon is a significant development in China, exerting a major influence on the management of the largest Chinese business firms, and becoming a significant topic of inquiry among Chinese management scholars. Other articles give brief overviews of the main characteristics of Chinese corporate, or "enterprise," 3 culture based on broad surveys, but they do not provide detailed analysis of individual firms (Cooke 2008; Tsui, Wang & Xin 2006; Xin et al 2002) . Indeed, one of these studies noted a "void" in the literature on how corporate culture is perceived to work in China (Cooke 2008, 294). 4 In this paper, we will begin to correct the neglect of this topic by scholars writing in
English. We will describe the cultural management techniques adopted by two of China's most successful large corporations, and the key role of their CEOs in promoting the cultural management approach. This section of the paper is based on the firms' own published documents, including firm websites, CEOs' speeches, and authorized publications, as well as secondary accounts by Chinese management scholars. Then we will provide a critique of these firms' cultures, identifying the negative consequences of their management styles, focusing especially on issues relating to employee morale and internationalization. We conclude that both firms will need to adjust their cultural values in significant ways in order to sustain their performance and become truly internationalized corporations.
Corporate Culture Defined
To understand how Chinese firms have transplanted what was originally a foreign management concept, we must first briefly explain what corporate culture means and where it came from. Corporate culture as a field of study took off in the early 1980s in the United States as a response to the Japanese economic "threat" (Ouchi 1981) . Deal and Kennedy (1982, 5) , amongst others, identified "strong" or "positive" corporate cultures as the main reason for the sustainable and successful business performance of both Japanese and outstanding American firms.
The typical feature that distinguishes the corporation with a "strong" culture from its mediocre peers is its strong set of shared values (Deal and Kennedy 1982, 22) . These corporate values need not be detailed or complicated. The most important thing is to ensure that they "are a reality in the minds of most people throughout the company, not just the senior executives" (Deal and Kennedy 1982, 23) .
Corporate culture theorists note that these values often stem from the vision and personal example of the firm's founder(s), and so the values are frequently illustrated using "stories" or "myths" about these founders (Schein 1985, ch.10) . Alternatively, the values may be underscored by the behavior of exceptional employees or managers, so-called corporate "heroes." Such heroes must be consciously celebrated -and their work publicized -to guide and inspire other employees to embrace the firm's values (Deal and Kennedy 1982, ch. 3).
In theory, through promoting a set of positive values among their employees, corporations will be able to change their mindset and make them more committed to their work. Employees will then volunteer their best for the corporation, and there will be little need for external rules and discipline (Ouchi 1981, 81, 83) .
Another practice that distinguishes the culture of "excellent" corporations is their conscious use of "rites and rituals" to give employees a sense of belonging and make their work meaningful (Deal and Kennedy 1982, 63) . These rituals include awards ceremonies, social events, and various opportunities for employees and managers to communicate with each other and feel a sense of collective cohesion (Deal and Kennedy 1982, 64-75) .
Finally, corporate culture texts invariably assert that successful corporations adapt and continually improve their cultures in response to changes in the external business environment. A "successful" manager should be able to use the various cultural techniques mentioned above to transform a "negative" corporate culture into a positive one that improves employee performance and productivity (Kilmann, Saxton & Serpa 1986, ch. 12-19) .
Of course, besides the various social indoctrination methods noted above, the senior management must also ensure that the firm's formal incentive systems follow the new cultural norms and suppress the old ones, so that "social energy" and the "formal system" will work together to make the organization succeed (Kilmann, Saxton & Serpa 1986, 369) .
Since the 1980s, scholars have identified major flaws in the assumptions of these early corporate culture proponents (Parker 2000, 15-26; Sheldrake 2003, 200-3 ). Yet many business executives seem to believe there are tangible benefits in applying a cultural approach to leadership. Large American and Australian firms, for example, expend significant resources on typical "cultural management" techniques such as diagnosing or adjusting the firm's "values," "vision," and "mission statement"; organizing firm "rituals"; and celebrating corporate "heroes" (Frankel 2007; Jones et al 2006) . And as we noted above, Chinese business leaders have also embraced the concept of corporate culture in increasing numbers and applied it to their firms, claiming that it has resulted in dramatic improvements in business performance.
Cultural Management Techniques at Haier and Huawei
In this section, we will demonstrate how two well-known Chinese firms, Haier Group Zhengfei and six partners in 1988 to import foreign technology and assemble simple telephone switch products for the domestic market (G. Zhang 2007, 23-4, 135, 223-4) .
Huawei now dominates the Chinese market for wireless telecommunications equipment, and has expanded its business to over 100 countries, competing with multinationals like Corporate culture is … the soul of a corporation. If a corporation lacks its own culture, it may be able to grow fast for a short period, but it will lack stamina and won't last long (R. Zhang, 1998, 340) .
And Ren Zhengfei has declared:
Resources are limited; only culture renews itself unceasingly. ... Huawei does not have natural resources that it can rely on, so it can only depend on the enormous 'oil fields,' 'forests' and 'mines' that are found inside peoples' minds (Huawei Technologies 1998, art.6).
The cultural transformation techniques as applied by Haier and Huawei can be conceptualized into a framework of five interrelated levels (as shown in The following subsections analyze these five levels in more detail.
A. Defining the corporate philosophy and values
The core philosophy and values of these two firms are simple, but were innovative in the Chinese business environment of the 1980s and1990s (Tung 1982, 66-8; Jackson 1992, 114-20) . Haier has embraced the values of quality and "zero defects" since the 1980s, and has also consistently promoted the value that the customer is always right, and there should be "zero distance" between Haier's employees and its customers. Finally, Haier constantly states that innovation, whether of technology or of business processes, is key to its success, allowing Haier to create its own brand and stay ahead of the competition in China and overseas (Haier n.d.(b); and Luo et al, 2006, 344-61) .
The values of Huawei Technologies are similar in substance to those of Haier, both companies being fiercely market and customer driven, although Huawei expresses these values in a slightly different way. It advocates constant "self-criticism," "hard struggle,"
and "study" to improve the quality of the firm's products and technology. Huawei's employees are the only thing that separates the firm from total collapse; they need to constantly innovate to stay ahead of the competition. And Huawei's employees must develop a "culture of service" to customers, ensuring that everything they do improves
Huawei's market position. If a product has no market value, it is a useless product (Z. Ren 1996a, b; 1997b; Huawei Technologies 1998, arts. 6, 8, 25) .
While the values that Haier and Huawei promote exhibit similarities to each other and to those of numerous other firms, both have adopted interesting methods to implement these values, beginning with some distinctive corporate "myths."
B. Creating corporate myths to underscore the firm's values According to the corporate culture theorists, a corporate myth is a story about the firm's CEO and/or employees that shows the firm's core values being put into practice in a memorable and vivid, even shocking, way. Through the initial event, and through subsequent repetition in speeches, firm publications, and informal conversations, the story spreads to all current and future employees, motivating them to emulate the example and improve their performance (Schein 1985, ch.10 ).
The most famous myth at Haier is the fridge smashing incident. In 1985, customers complained about the poor quality of refrigerators made by the firm. Zhang Ruimin, then factory manager, found that 76 refrigerators in the warehouse were defective. Some proposed that these refrigerators be sold to employees at a discount, as was common practice among other Chinese enterprises at that time. But Zhang Ruimin made an "unreasonable" decision that these refrigerators should be destroyed in public by the workers who made them. Zhang even took up a sledgehammer to participate in the smashing. This reinforced the message that poor quality products would not be tolerated by the management. This episode could have been forgotten after a few years, as Haier subsequently became a highly successful fridge manufacturer by the early 1990s. But it has been constantly repeated in Zhang Ruimin's speeches, on the firm's website, and in the firm's training sessions for new employees even down to the present (R. Zhang 1998; and Haier, n.d.(c) ). There is no doubt that Zhang Ruimin wants this event to be a "mythical" illustration of the importance of continually improving quality for Haier's success. are making this into such a big spectacle is to carve it deeply into your hearts, knowing that it will be passed down through the generations.... Only through constant selfcriticism will we be able to mature quickly." (Z. Ren 2000a).
Space does not permit a detailed examination of several other myths that these two firms have cultivated over the years, each one designed to underscore the crucial importance of core values or new values that they are seeking to introduce. The key point to note is the conscious repetition of the significance of the original mythical event over the years so that its cultural meaning is "carved deeply" into the hearts of all employees. Haier is famous for developing an arrestingly strict employee performance evaluation process called the OEC system. 'O' stands for overall -in other words, over the whole firm; 'E' stands for every task, every day, and every employee; and 'C' stands for control (every task is controlled) and also for 'clear' (in the sense of clearing up every daily task before the end of each day). Targets are given to each employee at the start of their daily shift, and they must meet or exceed these targets, while simultaneously maintaining required levels of quality and orderly behaviour, if they want to receive their full salary.
Bonuses and promotions are given to employees who consistently exceed their daily targets. Those who fall short have their pay docked or are demoted to probationary status.
One key feature of the OEC system is that employees find out immediately at the end of each shift how their performance has affected their financial remuneration for that day.
When combined with the various positive and negative reinforcing rituals mentioned earlier, this gives them a major incentive to perform at a high level every day. Another key feature is that employees are expected to improve their overall performance on average by 1% each day. This encourages them to constantly look for ways to increase their own efficiency and that of their work teams by suggesting changes to production processes or innovations that save the firm time and money (X. Ren 2007; Lin 2005) . While Haier's OEC system led to increased efficiency during the 1980s and 1990s, as the firm grew larger and hired more staff, it became more difficult to align the targets for individual employees with the market. For example, the firm's fridge division could efficiently produce millions of high quality fridges, but if there was not enough demand from customers, that work would be wasted. To avoid these kinds of inefficiencies, the firm needed a system that would reward each employee based primarily on the market performance of products in which they had been involved (R. Zhang 2000b).
So since 1998, Haier has modified the OEC system into the so-called SBU system.
Whereas businesses have traditionally been divided into strategic business units (SBUs)
based on products and/or functions (Hammer 2001, 129-36) , under Haier's version every employee would be treated as an SBU, or "little boss," with "zero distance from the firm's customers" (R. Zhang 2002a). Since not every employee would have direct contact with the firm's external customers, in practice the "customers" of each employee are the next people down the production chain within the firm, and the suppliers are the next people up the chain. Any failure by an individual employee to fulfill their part of the process in providing the correct products or to meet the contracted deadlines will allow the "customer" further down the chain to claim "compensation," which means a deduction in the employee's remuneration. The firm has set up a sophisticated software system that tracks every employee's contribution to this so-called "market chain" and provides them with a "profit and loss statement" every day to show how they are doing in terms of the market performance of products in which they are involved (Liu 2006, 117-38; Lin 2009, 46-8) .
Even non-manufacturing divisions of the firm, such as human resources, are included in the SBU system. This means that they must hire and train employees for the firm's various divisions who will perform satisfactorily in their allocated jobs. If they supply employees that are substandard, their "customers" in the firm's other divisions can seek compensation from the human resources division (Liu 2006, 126-7 ).
Haier's SBU system provided the financial incentives for the firm's employees to engage in a group-wide effort at business process reengineering and lean manufacturing with just-in-time production and "zero inventories," inspired by the writings of Michael
Hammer and James Champy (1993). According to Zhang Ruimin, the system is designed not to make employees meet their targets in a mechanical, unreflective way, but to change their whole mindset from that of workers to market-conscious "bosses" (R. Zhang 2002a (R. Zhang , 2002b .
Huawei has also adopted its own sets of management and process systems, and updated them over the years to inculcate its cultural values, with similar impressive financial results as those at Haier (Z. Ren 1995; G. Zhang 2007, 73-5, 230-2; Y. Wang 2007, 100-4, 178-80) . To avoid repetition, we will not examine these in detail. What is clear about the various reforms undertaken by both these firms is that their CEOs have played a pivotal role in seeing the need for reform in the first place, and taking a close interest in the reform process to ensure it is more than just half-hearted lip service to fashionable new management concepts: that it is actually implemented at the level of every manager and employee. Huawei is already in a period of ascendency, and this might easily make us think that the bitter and hard battles of the last eight years are over and that we are now victorious. This is extremely frightening! We still fall far short of many other
Chinese and foreign firms, and only by continuing to engage in fierce mental struggle ... will we manage to avoid destruction (Z. Ren 1996a).
Ren has continued to make such predictions of imminent doom consistently over the past fifteen years, despite Huawei's incredible growth (see, for example, Z. Ren 2001 Ren , 2008 ).
Zhang Ruimin has made similar comments, although not as dramatically as Ren Zhengfei. For example: "It's very easy to allow your success to defeat you … It's really important to know how to avoid being blinded by success, and the way we do that is by requiring everyone to constantly conquer themselves" (R. Zhang 2002a).
Presumably this sense of crisis, of total collapse just around the corner, is a sincere expression of these two CEOs' outlook, no matter how paranoid it appears to outside observers. And whether or not the employees at Haier and Huawei enjoy working in such a high pressure environment, one thing they cannot deny is that their CEOs are tirelessly working for their firms too, often at the expense of their families and their own health (Yi and Ye 2003, 67, 172; G. Zhang 2007, 72-3, 220 Ren 1995; G. Zhang 2007, 73-5) .
At the same time, they realize that foreign methods cannot be blindly imported without modification: they need to be adapted to the individual Chinese firm's context and expressed in terms of traditional or "revolutionary" Chinese ideas (R. Zhang 1998 Zhang , 2002b Z. Ren 2000b) .
Negative Aspects of Corporate Culture Transformation
Haier and Huawei have certainly achieved impressive growth and profitability over the past two or more decades, and some of this performance is doubtless due to the Yet their success has also come at a high cost, and it is arguable that the very cultural values that have dramatically improved these two firms' financial performance have also created serious problems among their workforces, and may obstruct their ability to sustain their international growth.
The first major issue that both these firms must address is how to deal with their growing workforces, and the cultural difficulties of employing increasing numbers of overseas employees as they expand into numerous countries. In their initial periods of growth, both Huawei and Haier have relied on draconian systems of rewards and penalties to It is particularly worrying that both firms have seen a high turnover of experienced personnel in recent years, as many of these employees have gone to work at competing firms (Ran 2005; Deng 2004, 87-8; G. Zhang 2007, 246-7) . This suggests that these firms' high salaries and bonuses are not enough to counterbalance employee stress and tension-filled working environments. Huawei's controversial decision to avoid giving long-term contracts to its senior employees under China's new Labour Contract Law (2008) did not help its public reputation either, and doubtless was highly unpopular among its own workforce too, despite being consistent with the firm's cultural practice of pay for performance and firing unproductive workers (Anon. 2007a (Anon. , 2007b Part of this problem is due to geopolitical and historical factors and ingrained prejudices over which Chinese firms have no control. There is little factual basis for the speculation that Huawei has close ties with the Chinese military or the CCP (G. Zhang 2007, 20, 55-6, 134-5) . But Huawei's refusal to clarify its true ownership has definitely added fuel to the speculation that it has something to hide. Huawei's senior management apparently A final issue that may hamper the growth of these two firms is a tendency to pressurize employees into squeezing out short-term gains that may result in long-term damage to their businesses. In the case of Haier, this has resulted in extreme diversification into sectors in which the firm has little aptitude or experience. Haier has used up significant resources attempting to expand into computers, mobile phones, furniture, pharmaceuticals, and foodstuffs, none of which have produced adequate returns on their investments (Deng 2004, 81-2). Haier's apparently random diversification strategy partly stems from its SBU system. This incentive system encourages all employees to become entrepreneurs and to develop products in any line of business, as long as it is profitable for the firm. But it almost inevitably leads to a mass of new products for which there is only a narrow short-term demand. This may be justifiable within China's domestic market, where even niche products can generate satisfactory revenues due to the enormous population. But in more mature (and smaller) Western markets, it looks like a strategy for short-term gain at the expense of long-term growth. At its worst, the profusion of hastily developed products and services may result in the erosion of Haier's hard-won brand reputation for quality (Deng 2004, 72-5) . By contrast, Huawei's problem is not diversification so much as intellectual property disputes. The firm has been plagued by lawsuits both within China and overseas, alleging that Huawei stole the I.P. of other firms, including such high-profile multinationals as Cisco Systems and Motorola (Wahba and Lee 2010) . Whatever the merits of such lawsuits, it is easy to infer that the high pressure placed on Huawei's employees to constantly innovate and rapidly produce marketable products may have led some of them to take short cuts and infringe the I.P.
rights of other technology firms.
Conclusion and Limitations of This Study
We have described the cultural management techniques by which Haier Group and Huawei Technologies claim to have improved their employees' performance and transformed their firms into internationally competitive businesses. We also identified several negative aspects of these firms' development that can be at least partly attributed to their cultural values, and that may obstruct their future potential unless efforts are made to adjust their values and implement corresponding new incentive systems. Of course, this is an ongoing process. Thus one of the limitations of the current study is that it is too early to see how successful Haier and Huawei will become on the international stage, or how they will adapt their cultures to deal with a truly multinational workforce.
Follow-up studies will need to be done in a few years time to answer these questions. A second limitation is that this study only looks at two firms, and therefore cannot draw broader conclusions about Chinese corporate culture and how it may differ from corporate culture practices in other countries, or how Haier and Huawei differ from other Chinese firms. Yet it is clear that cultural management is a major preoccupation of Chinese government and business leaders (Cooke 2008; Buckley et al 2008, 43-5) . Thus, further empirical research into the cultural management practices of other Chinese firms and the impact of the Chinese government on corporate culture promotion is required to round out the picture and to assess whether these practices will have a positive impact on the performance and organizational transformation of Chinese firms.
